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LOCATING CONSENT AND DISSENT IN AMERICAN RELIGION * 
by 
Martin E. Marty 
"We are a religious people whose institutions presuppose a Supreme Being." 
While the lasl clause of that dictum from the Su preme Court decision in Zorach 
u. Clauson (1951) may not be a demonstrable proposition, the first half of the 
sentence is. Such an assertion may seem to run counter Lo many generalizations 
about the secular character of American life. The United States was born late 
enough in Western history Lo fit well into many peoples' time table as a case of 
late-stage secularization. 1'he secular dimensions of American existence, then, 
must at least be referred to. 
The root of the secular aspect of American life is legal. The separation of 
civil and religious realms, an event or process which occurred during the first 
half century of national life, suggests that the stat.e can get along without ex­
plicit commitment to one or another metaphysical or religious positions. The 
United States Constitution is silent about such matters, and silence in this case 
implies consent. 
On that legal base thera _qave risen many other occasions for the judgment 
that America is secular. Foreign visitors for almost two hundred years have 
commented on the feverish Lhis-worldliness, the materialism, the pracLical 
godlessness of the people; in later years academic skepticism or agnosticism is 
as advanced and as characteristic of intellectual circles as is the case with 
'secular' Europe. Religious apathy, recent declines in the power of religious 
institutions, and the cancelling-out effects of religiously pluralistic voices all 
give rise to generalizations about American secularity. 
These generalizations are paradoxically matched by al least as impressive 
observations concerning the enduring religious character of the American people. 
'fhe majority of them belong to religious institutions; two out of five of them 
daim to attend their services weekly; reportedly, churches and synagogues 
represent an $80 billion investment; churches are sought out for rites of passage 
by the majority; we pledge allegiance to the flag in recent years 'under God'; 
"ln God We Trust" marks our money; we subsidize chaplains and tender tax­
exempt status Lo religious organizations; deference has normally been paid 
clerics. The signs are endless. 
IL is to the religious dimensions of this paradox t.hat we Lurn to discuss the 
location of conflict and concord in American spiritual life. However marginal 
religious organizations may be in the personal and political life of many citizens, 
people remain uneasy about the role of religion in basic societal issues. A 
structural-functional observation can serve first to see the two sets of needs 
religion ordinarily fulfils in personal and socieLal life, and then it can be applied 
to the local scene. Other terms are a;>propriate and variations could be endless, 
but let us refer to the 'integrative' and 'disruptive' roles of religion. 
*All future publication righis reserved by the author. 
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Reli�ion as integrator. By integration we imply the potenlial religion has to 
help the individual come to terms with the questions of values, meaning, and 
community. This help may refer lo his acceptance in a small grouµ of people 
who share his vision and become imporlanl lo him; it may refer Lo l.1e abilit} 
religion offers lo help random or Lhrealening features of existence fit in to some 
sort of intelligible scheme or pattern. Primitive man normally used religion in 
Lhis way; the location of villages and huts, roads and holy hills all suggt>sted lhal 
the cosmos could be reduced lo microcosm and he could find his place. The 
great religions have tended lo be coextensive with the borders of states or 
cultures, and provided rationales for Lhe poliliral and personal life of their mem­
bers. Even in modern pluralistic society, while no single religion serves for all 
citizens or a slate or culture, religion can serve on a voluntary basis Lo help them 
situate themselves in patterns of meaning and acceptance. 
Religion as disrupli'.:e (orce. l f  religion as an integrator can be expected to 
support civil concord, so will the olher religious elemenL complicate the question 
of consensus or unity in a society. Religion can be a disl'UpLive force within a 
culture whenever Lhe propheLic dimension is introduced, as is the case in Jewish 
and Christian tradition. There is a disparity between the prophets' vision of what 
is coming on one hand, and the present reality on the other. Or the moral de­
mands of a particular vision may run counter to the prevailing mores of a 
society and an abrasion results when the two confront each oLber. J\ lhird dis· 
ruplive factor may be the mystical, ecslalic, or other extraordinary ways or 
perceiving reality, which can enable the lives of the experiencing agents e�en 
as they can cause dys-ease among those who do not share them. 
Religion therefore may often imply exile or pilgrim status; it has often 
thrown its adherents into post.mes of dissent and oulcasLe status. Most. of 
today's internal connicts in mulli·religlous societies have religious di'llensions 
and most of today's wa.rs are, in some senses holy wars: Arab vs. lsraeli, Hindu 
vs. Muslim, Protestant vs. Catholic in Ireland, are only a few prominent 
examples. 
Clearly. religion can be an agency of discord in civil society. The founders or 
the Uniled Stales, gi\'en Lhe record of the Europe lhey had left and the pot.ential 
of the competitive colonial life they had known, had good reason to expect thal 
lhe discordant and dissenting elements would predominal.e in America. Hislo· 
rians have little difficulty finding evidences of both integrative and disrupthe 
features in American religious history. That is no novel assertion. This paper 
examines, however, whether we conventionally locale accurately the locales 
in which integration and disrupt.ion are fostered or expressed. 
Convenlional Consensus Religion. In the eyes of most observers, on a 
national scale religion t:as served chiefly to promote civil concord. l n  a complex 
society whose motto is 'e pluribus u11um' the accent almost always has to fall on 
the 'unum' when religion is referred to. There aire psychological, social, political, 
and religious neces.5ilics bebind such a stress. 'I'he alternative, it is regularly ob­
served , would be simple atomiwtion of society into lhe aimless or competitive 
\•isions of two hundred million members. Or, since many of these people will 
find each other in some sort of set of common expressions. there can be com-
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petilion between religious groups. These will cancel each other oul. and anomie 
may result. 
In past societies the consensus-generating features of religion were not hard 
to isolate and nurture. Where one religion prevails or, at best, where this one 
religion merely has lo tolerate quiet dissent as an uneasy host loleraLes an un­
ruly guest.. religion can easily serve as the integrator or interpreter of society. 
The king rules by divine right. People know their place in a theological scheme 
of things. 
In the Uniled States this has never been easily possible, since over two hun­
dred recognized organized religious groups have come to vie for altention, and 
these arc also split into smaller ju risdictions and a bewildering array of ideolog­
ical sub-cam ps. Yet Americans, again reacting lo the past record in Europe and 
the praclice of men almost everywhere, knew lhe unprofilabilily o f  holy war in 
their socicly and took conscious and unconscious steps to assure that religion 
would ordinarily play a concordant role. 
This role has been perceived most easily in those periods of national history 
when the highest premium was placed on a single ational consensus. During Lbe 
four years when Lhere were 'two nations' here, this procrss can best be seen. 
Abraham Lincoln regarded the Union with an almost mystical concern; the 
Confederacy was held together and its morale was sustained in no small part. in 
Protestanl religious terms. Whenever anomie threatens. apathy impinges, anarchy 
is feared. people have turned to religion Lo promole consensus. 
Most recently in post-World War II America, there were reasons for people to 
stimulate and to observe the consensus-engendering elements of religion. Thus 
in the Eisenhower years, as the Cold War heated up, it was important for 
Americans home from the wars to find roots, Lo have their anxieties ministered 
to and their complacencies supported . Over against 'atheistic communism', the 
enemy, it was imporlant to point lo the theistic commitment of this society. 
A school or historians, now dubbed chiefly by its enemies as 'consensus 
history' regularly pointed to the unifying di mensions of religion. These histori­
ans spoke or lhe 'givens' of national life, lhe ways in which the peculiar blend of 
resources and people predisposed Americans Lo come to terms wilh each other 
in a particular way. Thal particular way demanded religious homogenization; at 
the very least there was observance of the blurring of the lines between religious 
and civil orders, the mingling of relig.ous and political thought. True, each group 
had ii s separate theological commitments, buL whal mallel'ed was what was 
shared. 
Assurance was given that now as always, whatever the various sects or parlies 
held in their particularities, these were irrelevant to or at least not disruptive of 
the demands and necessities of the inclusive civil order. The denominations were 
harmless; they cancelled each other out. People could have separate \·iews of 
ultimate reality because their proximate views of civil society could be amassed 
into an alternative religious \'ision that transcended cullic views or the ultimate. 
The public good made the demands; while they no longer had coercive or 
legalistic su pport, churches were even stronger now because they relied on 
persuasive and voluntary spheres. 
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The resul�, by common observalion, has been lhe development or a religious 
Gestalt that has been dubbed, variously. 'laiy', 'folk', 'generalized'. 'societal', 
'national', or 'civil' reli�ion. By most definitions of the religious phenomenon, 
this generalized religion 'belongs'. rt does succeed, however casual the allegiances 
seem superficially to be, to aLlracl the ultimate concerns of ils adherents. One 
dies for the nalional religion as he does not for sectarian failh; he is allowed less 
latitude of expression and finds it easier to be a heretic in civil religion-despite 
ils loose definitions-than in sectarian religion, howe\ler rigid ils dogmas. 
To this ultimate cor.cern are added other characteristic features of religion. 
There is a mytho-symbolic expression in flags, informal creeds, mollos and 
slogans, historical dramas and written history; this expression serves lo reduce 
and interpret reality for the many. And these myths and symbols are celebrated 
or enacted through ritual or ceremonial reinforcement: a cycle of national 
holidays provides a sort of tilurgical year. There are sanctuaries, memorial sites, 
sacred shrines. Quac;i-metaphysical claims are made for the self-evident t.ruths 
whirh belonged to thal original 'compact' compact on whose terms the society 
came together; the compact is elltborated upon infinitely. And cor.sequenl 
action or behavior is expected: this religion like any other implies significanl 
gestures and postures and expects moral fulfilment. Hans Kohn, Carlton J. H. 
Hayes, Robert Bellah, Sidney E. Mead, J. Paul Williams, Robin Williarru, Lloyd 
Warner, Will Herberg ar.d others have isolated and defined this religiou3 realily 
quite appropriately around mid-century or after, in the 'consensus-seeking' years. 
Such a religion does provide integration for a complex society; il nurtures 
individuals' identity and gives lhem power. But questions are raised almost 
instantly about the va�ue, truth. and worth of such a religious form and ex­
pression. Three attitudes stand out. 
Affirmation occurs on the part of those who stress the dangers of anarchy 
and anomie or atomization; a foreign foe may inspire the acceptance of a 
common societal religion, bul internal threats of breaking up or conlen:ion can 
sen·e as well. Affirmation may come from lhe 'right', where a creedal orthodoxy 
of national values is imposed over against external and internal heretical 
conspiratorial forces. From lhe 'lefl' there will often be a different version of 
fhe same kind of support, especially among lhose who see in the democralic 
process itself the final repository of truth-value continuums. Defenders or such 
a common faith claim that critics see only its worst dimensions and compare 
these to the putative 'bE'sts' of particular faiths. 
Negation of common religion tends to come from Lhose who assert the values 
of various particularities. In America these values have characLel"islicalJy been 
associated with denominational, confessional, and theological pecularities or 
particularities, though-as we shall see-these need not be the only base of 
particularism. If Lhe amrmers often give evidence of monistic hungers or 
commitments, those who negate societal religion often seem Lo be able to be at 
home with what William James called a kind of metaphysically 'pbralistic 
universe'. 
Those who are critical Lend to point out to Lhe whole society the dangers of 
religious monopoly, no matter how inform.al and subtle. lnevitably implied 
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coercion seems to go along with the civil religious rites, while free men can 
simply exempt themselves or absent themselves when sectarian religion is 
practiced. Prophets fear idolatry; definers, blurring. From some normative 
standpoint or other they find their sub-groups' commitments to be true and the 
larger societies' homogenizing faiths to be false. Hooked on to the realities of 
Realpolilill a culture-wide religious expression strjkes critics as being particu­
larly dangerous. 
A third attitude, and one which is probably sought by the majority of the 
most thoughtful and careful affirmers and negators, is dialectical. Dialecticians 
see the values in common religion but fear some of its effects; they may wish lo 
celebrate theological particularities of sub-communities, but do not want to see 
these become ends in themselves. From Jonathan Edwards through Reinhold 
Niebuhr one strand of American religious thought has been able to combine a 
belief that the American environment is somehow revelatory and redemptive, 
with faith in a transcendent order which calls the American religious pretension 
into judgment. As a result, one can be both engaged and detached. 
In the civil realm the tradition runs at least from Jefferson through Lincoln 
and has been expressed with some care after mid-century by a figure such as 
Adlai Stevenson. Jefferson could both say that Americans were a chosen people 
(the root of a civil religious sense) and that all people were chosen who properly 
stewarded the earth. Abraham Lincoln was even more sophisticated as he spoke 
in the affirmation of America's chosenness but kept some prophet.ic dist.ance 
by speaking of the nation as "God's almost chosen people." ln Paul Tillich's 
terms. this tradition allows 'catholic substance' (positi,·e culture-building 
value) for national religion and asserts •protestant principle' of prophetic pro­
test over against it. 
The Religion of Dissent and Particularism 
ff we are to continue our examination of the conventional location of 
religion in our complex society, it is possible to see dissent placed chiefly in the 
successful and as.sertive denominational tradition. Just as obvious to every for­
eign observer as is America's societal religion is the fact of religious competition 
and denominational proliferation. Instead of a host/guest situation, t.he Ameri­
can l<>gal tradition and practice allows for a "multiplicity of sect.s," as James 
Madison spoke of them, all enjoying legally equal status. 
Denominationalism, which Sidney E. Mead called "the shape of Protestantism 
in America" comes to most observers to be the shape of religion in America. The 
denominations allow their members lo safeguard particular views of the ultimate 
while ordinarily they can support the national consensus religion. Exceptions 
have been rare: at various moments in American history the larger citizenry has 
reared Mormon theocracy and polygamy; Jehovah's Witnesses' rejection of civil 
religion or that group's and Christian Sciences's particular views of healing or 
rejection of conventional medicine; or Amish and llutterite isolation and moral 
distinctiveness. But most denominations play the public game well enough lo 
be permitted private particularity. 
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Denominalional religion sounds as if it is the main repository o" dissent. 
Certainly lhe rhetoric has been lhere: creedalists, dogmatists, and revivalists 
have often sounded 11s if they were mortal foes out lo do each other in. 
Competition for placement. of denominat1onaJ churches in post-war suhurbs was 
as intense os any commercial competition has ever been. 
However, theoloi;:ical particularity and contention is regarded as a national 
luxury. Debates o\·er transubstantiation, apostolic succes.')ion, immersion in 
baptism have exercised and agitated adherents or lwo or more sects at any 
given moment, but society at large did not tremble over outcomes. 
Since denominational clissension is assumed to be present and il� dangers 
feared, rnuny attempts have been made to reduce iL. From within, positive 
steps have been taken Lo stimulate consensus through ecumenical or interfaith 
moves. Jr denomination.al concord is arrived at, all will be well. From without. 
lhe society devises various ways to minimize denominalional conflict. The 
apparently dangerous but always mild minisler-pricst-rabbi jokes, lhl' careful 
regard politicians show religious voters' blocs, and the high societal premium 
placed on religious concord despite meaningful differences are examples of 
attempts lo minimize conaict. 
Several altitudes may be taken toward particular religion, just as they were 
shown generalized faith. Affirmers affirm because they believe in their own 
creed and enjoy ils expression and bonefils. or because Lhey celebrale the 
lradilion of religious freedom whether or nol the� are regular adherents of a 
religious organization. Denominalionalism is the guarantee of faith and freedom. 
Sometimes the results of competition-the general health of America's volun· 
taryisl churches-are advertised as being a theological certificalion of lhe 
value of the American way. 
On the critical side, ecumenists, world-integrators, those who share positive 
religious views of both ultimate and proximate unity deplore <lcnominationalism. 
The non-religious in society often see no poinl lo the whole denominational 
venture. Some fear the encroachments of larger (particularly Roman Catholic or 
ecumenical Protestant) combinations of religious forces. 
Here as in Lhe civil case. Lhere has been room for a dialeclical position. Many 
celebrators of civil religion have used denominational particularity to help Lhem 
qualify or compromise their commitment to a religion lhey feel can become loo 
embracing and demanding. Many negators of civil religion find in denomination· 
lism the base for prophetic slances. Those who stand chiefly in the particularisl 
lradilions tend. as noted above, either lo be able to live with a pluralislic uni· 
verse or, as Father John Courlney Murray once implied, can brackPl their 
ultimate metaphysically monistic commiLmenLs for Lhe sake of dealing with 
givens of pluralism in Lhe city of man. 
In summary to this point, we have suggested that lhe religious dimensions of 
American existence and experience have generally been divided on these tiines: 
consensus or integration is reposed in societal religion; dissent or disruption are 
the potentials of denominational religion. While there is no reason Lo seek to 
demolish this conventio:-ial wisdom, it is my thesis that the situation is seen in 
a much different light it' one looks for connict and consensus in various patterns 
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of organization of life between civil and denomi national religion. 
To introduce this point it is profitable to ask some questions. First, i f  
denominationalism i s  so productive o f  authentic connicl, where are the dead 
bodies? Holy wars leave dead bodies; Puritan Revolutions and the Thirty Years 
War just before the formation of America and countless jihads and crusades ever 
since suggest the potential for physical violence in religious differentiation. But 
America has few such 'dead bodies'; a few Mormons, a few Roman Catholics, 
perhaps a Mason or two are pointed to and religious factors may have been pre· 
sent in each. 
Given the violence of American history which reaches climaxes in events such 
as Lhe Civil War, however, these bloody conflicts are statistically negligible; they 
play little part in Americans' recall; they do not often threaten today. Religious 
conflict on denominational l ines, then. is not intense enough to threaten the 
civil order. 
Put another way, the question could read, "What does society have to fear or 
hope for from denominational concord?" I ndividuals may feel ostracized if they 
arc rejected by a denomination-but there are always plenty of acceptant ones 
available; individuals may find perso:ial sal\'ation through them. But does 
American society as a whole look for great benefits from .  say. a successful 
outcome or the Consultation on Church Union, when even most members are 
but dimly aware of ils efforts? Doctrinal disputes within or between denomina­
tions have normally had little public consequence, threat, or promise. 
Yet there has been conmct in American religion; one simply must look 
elsewhere and relocate it. !Here one moves beyond the universal/particular 
models provided by civil versus denominalional religion. Conflict can be found 
chiefly on the matters of trjbe, race, ethnic group, movement, or cause-each of 
which are not necessarily perceived as being fundamentally reUgious but each of 
which is colored by religious concerns and interpretations. 
Indian/white, black/white, north/�outh, expansionist/white-man's-burden, 
sometimes liberal/conservative-these ha\'e usually been the lines of conflict. 
They may be seen Lo be simply secular, but he who overlooks the religious 
dimension will miss the drama of American history and may overlook threats 
and promises in the future. 
Old and New Tribalisms as Loci of Consensus and Conflict 
To take a few public examples: First, the Afro-American movement has made 
its way under various religious banners. Pan-Africanism, Martin Luther King's 
non-violent integrationism, the Black Muslim movement, Albert Cleage's black 
regionalism-all of these are examples of black movements whose power lay in 
no small measure in the leaders' abilities lo in voke religious responses. 
Amerindians who tell whites that "Custer died for your sins" resort to 
theological terminology and religious understandings of power to pose them­
selves over against white oppressio n. "Sisterhood is powerfuJ!" The movements 
for consciousness-raising and women's liberation are normaHy perceived secu­
larly, but as they unfold they find it necessary lo undertake religious analyses 
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and make quasi-religious claims. Jews find their identity and assert their power 
by reflection on parLicular events such as the Ilolocausl and on implied <'01\Cepls 
o f  chosenness in many aspects associated wilh the formation of Israel. 
Whenever there is a mm·emenl. there seems Lo be a religious ell os. The 
counter culture of lhe 1960s looked to Eastern and African primal religion for 
many of its impulses, and ils communes, drug-culture, and ritual was oflen ex· 
plicit.ly religious. The regrouping of white ethnics and WASPS in politically 
potent Middle American-Silent Majoritarian nexuses often takes Lhe Catholicism 
and Protestantism of tt'ese complexes for granted. but this masks the religious 
racialist appeals whiC'h sanctioned lheir separate histories in lhe past and over­
looks many elements of contemporary appeal. 
The old ethnicity and Lbe new ethnicity, the old tribalism and the new. the 
natural and the artificial groupings of Americans almost always seek lo provide 
idenlit.y and power Lo people who cannol appropriate America's civil religion 
directly or who wanl to make formal war on it. At the very least, membership in 
old ethnic group or new counter cullural tribe (or whatever) serves to refracL the 
experience- of civil religion into particularisl communities' schools of inter­
pretalion. At the most, membership in such groups ic; designed to guarantee 
peculiarity even aL the expense of civil discord. 
Our questions can be answered in a diCfcrent way, then, when we move from 
denominalional to tribal organization. There have been and are dead bodies as a 
result of conflict enhanced by religious symbolization in these groups. Society 
does have something to fear Crom conflict between them and has something to 
hope for when that conmct js rendered creative or when il is transcended. 
Historians today are retracing their steps to see the religious dimensions of 
ethnicily-raciality throughout .\merican history. a history which often has 
obscured religious ethnicism in the old WASP majority. Meanwhile analysts of 
the contemporary are coming to new understandings of identity and power in 
tribalism with its religious dimensions. 
More than a sense or symmetry occasions a glance al atliludinal allevnalives 
to this religious clustering. Here again there has been room for affirmation: 
unless one finds himself or herself in a sub-group, say the celebrators of lri· 
balism or counler cultures, he will be lost and powerless. The whole society 
cannot provide a sufficien Uy clarified identity, and repressive Lolenmce by 
the homogenized whole will exploit Lhe situation of those who luek identity 
and visibility. On the negative side, it is possible lo see that unchecked tri· 
balism can lead to disintegration of society and reestablishment of jungle con· 
ditions: people will be al each others' throats in defense of 'chosenness' and in 
the name of the gods. 
The dialectical 'iew is poised over against these. l l  recognizes ps) chological 
and political \•alues in pen-ultimate attachment lo particular groups (be they 
racial, ethnic, political, religious, or commilted lo various life-styles) even while 
it does not lose sight of ullimatc \•alues associated with religious visions of a 
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